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NOTE 
FOR PEAT’S SAKE! 
JURISDICTIONAL DETERMINATIONS, HAWKES, AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Wesley A. Vorberger† 
ABSTRACT 
Under the Clean Water Act, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) is 
vested with the power to regulate “waters of the United States” by 
administering a statutorily mandated permit process. A preliminary part of 
this permit process is the issuance of a Jurisdictional Determination (“JD”), 
which declares whether the property in question is considered to contain 
“waters of the United States” subject to the permit process. There are two types 
of JDs: preliminary and approved. JDs can also be revised by the Corps for 
various reasons. Until the Eighth Circuit issued its decision in Hawkes v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers, only approved JDs could be appealed, and only 
through the Corps administrative appeal process. Prior to Hawkes and under 
Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, JDs were not subject to judicial 
review in the federal courts because according to the Fifth Circuit a JD is not a 
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court, as 
required under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Hawkes, however, 
held that each of the criteria for reviewability was present in a JD, and that it 
was thus subject to judicial review. This split in the circuits will be short lived, 
as the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on Hawkes and will conclusively 
answer the question of a JD’s reviewability. The issue before the Court in 
Hawkes is whether a revised approved JD meets the requirements of finality 
and adequacy of remedy under the APA and is subject to judicial review. 
This Note seeks to provide the best framework for analyzing the 
reviewability of a JD, using the strongest arguments in support of Hawkes’ 
holding, while, at the same time, delineating the court’s proper role and its 
power of judicial review. It is the position of this Note that Hawkes was 
ultimately correct in its holding that a JD is subject to judicial review under the 
APA. However, the court’s rationale in Hawkes is flawed in two main respects. 
First, Hawkes inappropriately emphasizes the regulatory burden and impact 
of the permit process, and fails to make the stronger argument that a JD is, by 
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its very nature, a final agency action. By focusing on the JD itself, the court 
could have clearly demonstrated that a JD not only creates an obligation to 
complete the permit process, but also determines rights of the landowner. 
Second, the court should have tempered its analysis with the concerns of Judge 
Kelly’s concurring opinion and should not have been so critical of the Corps 
and the cost and efficiency of the entire regulatory scheme. In its prudential 
critique of this scheme, the court transgressed it constitutional power of judicial 
review by wrongly answering a political question. The court in Hawkes should 
have avoided this critique and addressed only the matter before it. While the 
Supreme Court should affirm the holding in Hawkes, it should avoid such a 
prudential critique in its analysis of the issue. Overall, a proper understanding 
of the strengths and flaws of Hawkes will help yield the correct outcome on 
appeal and illustrate the appropriate analysis that should be used in the 
process. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hawkes v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers epitomizes the struggle between 
regulatory agencies and regulated citizens. In Hawkes, the plaintiff sought 
judicial review of a Jurisdictional Determination (“JD”) made by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers.1 The JD declared the plaintiff’s land was under the 
jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act and subject to an involved permit 
process.2 The District Court held that the approved JD was not a “final agency 
action” and thus not reviewable.3 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the District Court’s ruling, and held that the approved JD was a 
“final agency action” subject to judicial review.4  
It is the position of this Note that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Hawkes reached the correct conclusion regarding the reviewability of the JD, 
contrary to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers.5 Since the Supreme Court of the United States has granted 
certiorari on Hawkes to settle the issue of a JD’s reviewability under the APA,6 
                                                                                                                                        
 1. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 998, 1000. 
 3. Id. at 996. 
 4. Id. at 1002.  
 5. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub 
nom., Kent Recycling Servs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015). 
 6. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hawkes on the following question presented: 
Whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ determination that the 
property at issue contains “waters of the United States” protected by the Clean 
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this Note will seek to provide a defense of Hawkes, albeit a critical one. This 
will be done by demonstrating the reviewability of a JD through precedential 
and statutory analysis as well as by scrutinizing the court’s inappropriate 
prudential critique of the Corps’ regulatory scheme. A proper resolution on 
appeal will not only provide the landowners with a new avenue to challenge 
the determination of the Corps, but also prevent the possibility of any 
regulatory abuse. 
II. STATUTORY AND CASE LAW BACKGROUND 
To properly understand what is happening in Hawkes, it is important to 
recognize the interplay between several relevant statutes and cases. These 
statutes and cases serve as the basis for any court deciding whether judicial 
review is appropriate for a JD. The two statutes relevant here are the Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”)7 and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).8 These 
two acts work together for the regulatory purpose of “maintain[ing] the . . . 
integrity of the Nation’s waters”9 under the CWA. To the extent not specified 
in the CWA, the APA controls the specific requirements and restrictions to 
which agencies must adhere in executing their congressionally delegated 
power. Furthermore, three relevant cases, Sackett v. Environmental 
Protection Agency,10 Bennett v. Spear,11 and Belle v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers,12 provide the precedential constellation Hawkes must use to 
navigate the issue at hand. These cases build upon one another and lay the 
groundwork for the circuit split as to whether a JD is a final agency action, 
with no other adequate remedy in a court, subject to judicial review under 
the APA.  
                                                                                                                                        
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1362 (7); see 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., constitutes “final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. 704, and 
is therefore subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. 701 et seq. 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015). 
 7. See generally 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq. (West 2016). 
 8. See generally 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 500 et seq. (West 2016). 
 9. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West 2016). 
 10. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012). 
 11. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
 12. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub 
nom., Kent Recycling Servs., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015). 
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A.  The Clean Water Act 
The statutory authority for regulating wetlands, like the one at issue in 
Hawkes, comes from the CWA. The CWA purports to regulate for the 
purpose of maintaining and restoring the “chemical, physical and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”13 This ambitious goal was initially set out in 
1948, under what was called the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.14 It was 
later amended, both in 1972 and 1977, and became what is now known as the 
CWA.15 At issue in Hawkes is 33 U.S.C. § 1344, which gives the Secretary of 
the Army, via the Chief of Engineers, authority to issue permits “for the 
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites.”16 The CWA exercises its enforcement power under 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319, which provides for various administrative, civil, and criminal 
penalties.17 
A part of the permit process authorized by 33 U.S.C. § 1344 involves the 
issuance of a JD by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to landowners seeking 
a permit. All JDs fall into one of two categories:18 preliminary19 or approved.20 
Under the CWA, a JD is defined as “a written Corps determination that a 
wetland and/or waterbody is subject to regulatory jurisdiction under Section 
404 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1344) . . . .”21 A JD is based on several 
factors such as “indicators of adjacency to navigable or interstate waters; 
indicators that the wetland or waterbody is of part of a tributary system; or 
indicators of linkages between isolated water bodies and interstate or foreign 
commerce.”22 Additionally, an approved (or final) JD is subject to an 
                                                                                                                                        
 13. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West 2016). 
 14. Jonathan D. Sater, Sackett v. EPA: The Murky Confluence of Due Process and 
Administrative Compliance Orders Under the Clean Water Act, 7 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 329, 339 
(2013). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a), (d) (West 2016). 
 17. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (West 2016). 
 18. 33 C.F.R. § 331.2 (2016) (“All JDs will be in writing and will be identified as either 
preliminary or approved.”). 
 19. Id. (“Preliminary JDs are written indications that there may be waters of the United 
States on a parcel or indications of the approximate location(s) of waters of the United States 
on a parcel. Preliminary JDs are advisory in nature and may not be appealed. Preliminary JDs 
include compliance orders that have an implicit JD, but no approved JD.”). 
 20. Id. (“Approved jurisdictional determination means a Corps document stating the 
presence or absence of waters of the United States on a parcel or a written statement and map 
identifying the limits of waters of the United States on a parcel. Approved JDs are clearly 
designated appealable actions and will include a basis of JD with the document.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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administrative appeal process.23 This review process is well illustrated in 
Exhibit 1-1 which is provided as an appendix to the relevant Corps 
regulations.  
 
Exhibit 1-124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
 23. See generally 33 C.F.R. § 331.7 (2016); 33 C.F.R. Pt. 331, App. C. (2016). 
 24. 33 C.F.R. Pt. 331, App. C. (2016). 
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It is important to clarify that the issue in Hawkes is whether a revised 
approved JD is appealable to a Federal Court and subject to judicial review 
under the APA, not whether it is appealable to the administrative agency 
under the CWA.25  
B.  The Administrative Procedure Act 
The APA has been called the “heart of administrative law,” and for good 
reason.26 “The APA is the foundation of the administrative statutory scheme” 
from which government agencies derive their regulatory power.27 The APA 
provides agencies with the ability to make legally binding orders.28 
Furthermore, the APA sets forth procedures for judicial review of those 
orders (unless otherwise specified in the agency’s governing statute).29 
Judicial review of an agency’s action may occur when “made reviewable by 
statute” or when it is a “final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in a court.”30 Furthermore, the APA states that “[a] 
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly 
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”31 
Judicial review is permitted under the APA with two exceptions: preclusion 
by a subsequent statute or to the extent that “agency action is committed to 
agency discretion by law.”32  
In light of the APA requirements, parties seeking judicial review naturally 
encounter the dispositive questions of: (1) whether an agency action is 
considered to be “final” and (2) whether there is no other adequate remedy 
in a court (also referred to as “no reasonable alternative” to judicial review). 
Without satisfying the requirements of the APA, a court will lack subject 
matter jurisdiction and be unable to adjudicate a review of the administrative 
                                                                                                                                        
 25. See 33 C.F.R. § 331.7 (2016) for more information on the Corps administrative appeal 
process. 
 26. See Sater, supra note 14, at 337.  
 27. See id. at 336. Another commentator has rightly recognized the APA’s proper role and 
purpose: “Congress created the APA as a ‘working compromise, in which broad delegations 
of discretion were tolerated as long as they were checked by extensive procedural safeguards.’ 
As a result, Congress established procedural requirements in the APA that went beyond the 
obligations of due process.” Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the 
Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency 
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 405-06 (1987). 
 28. Sater, supra note 14, at 338. 
 29. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (West 2016). 
 30. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 704. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See 5 U.S.C.A § 701. 
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order. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Sackett v. E.P.A.33 has been used as 
the standard for determining the reviewability of administrative orders. 
Furthermore, the Court in Sackett held that the CWA is subject to the judicial 
review provisions under the APA.34 
C.  Sackett v. E.P.A. 
In Sackett, the owners of a parcel in Idaho brought a civil action under the 
APA against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to challenge 
an administrative compliance order (“ACO”).35 The ACO stated that the 
landowner’s property was subject to regulation under the CWA.36 An ACO 
is a final agency action when it determines rights or obligations, or legal 
consequences flow from its issuance, and it marks the consummation of the 
agency’s decision-making process.37 The ACO in Sackett ordered the 
landowners to restore their property, which had fill material placed on it 
pursuant to an EPA “work plan.”38 The district court dismissed Sackett’s civil 
action for want of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed.39 Although Sackett’s appeal arose out of a dispute 
regarding the scope of “navigable waters” under the CWA, the Supreme 
Court’s analysis was limited only to the issue of whether the Sacketts could 
challenge the ACO in court.40 
                                                                                                                                        
 33. Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1369 (2012). 
 34. Id. at 1374 (“Here, there is no suggestion that Congress has sought to exclude 
compliance-order recipients from the Act’s review scheme; quite to the contrary, the 
Government’s case is premised on the notion that the Act’s primary review mechanisms are 
open to [compliance-order recipients] . . . . The Clean Water Act does not preclude [APA] 
review.”). 
 35. Id. at 1370-71. An “Administrative Compliance Order” is defined under the Clean 
Water Act as: 
Whenever on the basis of any information available to him the Administrator 
finds that any person is in violation of section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1328, 
or 1345 of this title, or is in violation of any permit condition or limitation 
implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under section 1342 of this 
title by him or by a State or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by 
a State, he shall issue an order requiring such person to comply with such section 
or requirement, or he shall bring a civil action in accordance with subsection (b) 
of this section. 
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(3). 
 36. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1369. 
 37. Id. at 1371-72. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1371. 
 40. Id. at 1369. 
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The Court held that the ACO was, indeed, a final agency action without 
any adequate remedy apart from judicial review under the APA.41 Justice 
Scalia, delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, analyzed the issue 
according to the standard he had set forth in Bennett v. Spear which defined 
when an agency action is final.42 The Court in Bennett stated succinctly that 
two conditions must be met for an action to be final: “First, the action must 
mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must 
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. Second, the action must 
be one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from which 
‘legal consequences will flow.’”43 The Court in Sackett analyzed the ACO 
against the Bennett test and held that the Bennett test was, indeed, satisfied.44 
The Court further held that the CWA did not expressly or impliedly preclude 
judicial review under the APA, finding the Government’s argument that the 
CWA was preclusive to be unpersuasive.45 In so doing, the Court reversed the 
lower court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.46 
Understanding the Court’s precedent in Sackett is critical to the discussion 
in Hawkes because the ACO and the JD are often analogized to one another 
in determining reviewability. 
D.  Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Subsequent to the decision in Sackett, and while Hawkes was on appeal to 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined in Belle Company v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that a JD is not 
considered a “final agency action” and thus is not reviewable under the 
APA.47 In Belle, a JD was issued on a parcel of land which was owned by Belle 
Company and, in the event it could be used as a solid-waste landfill, subject 
to an option to purchase by Kent Recycling, LLC.48 The land at issue had 
previously been evaluated by several State and Federal agencies who reached 
various conclusions as to its character. Initially, it was classified as non-
wetlands not subject to the CWA by the Department of Agriculture and the 
EPA. It was then labeled as wetlands subject to the CWA by the Corps. Later 
it was declared to be “commenced-conversion cropland” by the Natural 
                                                                                                                                        
 41. Id. at 1374. 
 42. Id. at 1371-72. See also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). 
 43. Bennett,132 S. Ct. at 177-78 (citations omitted). 
 44. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371-72. 
 45. Id. at 1372-74. 
 46. Id. at 1374. 
 47. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 397 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 48. Id. at 386. 
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Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). Finally, it was determined as having 
its status as a wetland (dependent upon how the land was used) by joint 
guidance from the Corps and NRCS.49 After having already started and 
stopped an application for a permit before, the plaintiffs decided to pursue a 
CWA permit once again.50 In response, the Corps issued a JD stating that the 
land was considered waters of the United States and subject to the entire 
permit process.51 Together, the two companies challenged the JD in U.S. 
District Court in Louisiana.52 The District Court granted the government’s 
motion to dismiss and stated that the JD was not a “final agency action” 
reviewable under the APA.53 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court and dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.54  
The court held, inter alia, that under Sackett and the current prevailing 
doctrine, a JD was not an action in which either rights or obligations were 
determined or an action from which legal consequences flowed, making it 
non-reviewable under the APA.55 The court analyzed both of the Bennett 
conditions to reach its conclusion. In so doing, it relied on the pre-Sackett 
case of Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to hold 
that the JD did, in fact, serve as the consummation of the Corps’ decision-
making process.56 However, the court in Belle distinguished the ACO in 
Sackett from the JD at issue and held that it did not determine rights or 
obligations, nor was it an action from which legal consequences flowed.57 The 
court found that unlike an ACO, which ordered restoration of the property, 
the JD was merely a “notification of the property’s classification” as a wetland 
under the CWA.58 It further distinguished the JD from an ACO by stating 
that the JD created no “penalty scheme” and instead of inhibiting the 
plaintiff’s obtaining of a permit, the JD encouraged it.59 Lastly, the court 
                                                                                                                                        
 49. Id. at 386-87. 
 50. Id. at 387. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. See also Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. CIV.A. 12-247-BAJ, 2013 
WL 773730 (M.D. La. Feb. 28, 2013). 
 53. Belle, 761 F.3d at 387. 
 54. Id. at 397 
 55. Id. at 394. 
 56. Id. at 389 (citing Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 
586, 591 (9th Cir. 2008)). It should also be noted that Belle comes to the same conclusion as 
Fairbanks. As such, the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion in Hawkes runs against two other circuits 
(the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit). 
 57. Id. at 394. 
 58. Id. at 391. 
 59. Id. at 392-93. 
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noted that the ACO in Sackett notified the landowner of a violation, whereas 
the JD at issue in Belle does not state any violation.60 Feeling it had sufficiently 
distinguished the JD from the ACO in Sackett, the court held that the JD was 
not a “final agency action” and affirmed the District Court’s granting of the 
Corps’ motion to dismiss.61 
A proper understanding of the CWA, the APA, and of Sackett, Bennett, 
and Belle helps to frame the legal landscape for what occurs in Hawkes. Some 
regulatory agencies are granted authority under the CWA to issue permits 
allowing landowners to discharge dredged or fill material into navigable 
waters (or waters of the United States).62 Furthermore, those agencies are 
empowered through the APA to issue orders, like an ACO, to rectify or notify 
of non-compliance.63 There is, however, a check on the agencies through 
judicial review. With few exceptions, judicial review is available when there 
is a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a 
court.”64 An agency action is considered “final” when it satisfies the Bennett 
test, as the Court applied it in Sackett, which requires that the order be the 
“consummation” of the agency’s decision making and that “legal 
consequence will flow” from the issuance, determining “rights or 
obligations.”65 The court in Belle found the order in Sackett and the JDs issued 
by the Corps to be distinguishable, and held that a JD is not considered a 
“final agency action” appealable under the APA.66 This set the stage for 
Hawkes and the ensuing split between the circuits. 
III. HAWKES V. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
A.  Hawkes in the District Court 
Before Hawkes was on the docket in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
it was in the U.S. District Court in Minnesota.67 The plaintiffs brought a cause 
of action against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief regarding the Corps’ JD that the property owned by the 
                                                                                                                                        
 60. Id. at 393. 
 61. Id. at 394. 
 62. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(a), (d) (West 2016). 
 63. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 558 (West 2016). 
 64. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701, 704. 
 65. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). 
 66. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 392-94 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 67. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013) 
rev’d and remanded, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015). 
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plaintiffs was subject to the Corps’ permitting process under the CWA.68 The 
property in question was a 530-acre parcel which was undisputedly labelled 
a “wetland.”69 It was prized by Hawkes for its “high-quality peat,” which was 
capable of supporting his business for “another 10-15 years.”70 In dispute, was 
whether the wetland constitutes “waters of the United States.”71 The Corps 
contended that “waters of the United States” includes wetlands adjacent to 
navigable waters, which the District Court found to be convincing in light of 
Supreme Court precedent.72  
The chronology of events is one that can be considered reasonable only by 
government standards. In March 2007, the plaintiff, Hawkes Company 
(“Hawkes”), met with the Corps and the Minnesota Department of Natural 
Resources to discuss his plans, which included filling or discharging materials 
onto the property.73 Hawkes then applied for a permit in December 2010.74  
In January 2011, Hawkes met with the Corps, which tried to convince him 
not to use the new property due to the cost and time involved in getting 
through the permit process.75 In March 2011, the Corps notified Hawkes that 
it had determined the wetland property was connected to the Red River of 
the North and thus was regulated by the CWA.76 This required that Hawkes 
go through the entire Corps permit process.77 The parties then met several 
more times and Hawkes was required to conduct around $100,000 in 
assessments on the property.78 In November 2011, Hawkes received a 
“preliminary” JD from the Corps which stated that, because the property was 
connected to a “relatively permanent water,” which connected it to the Red 
River of the North, which was a “navigable water,” the land was under the 
jurisdiction of the CWA.79 Hawkes responded by challenging the JD’s 
                                                                                                                                        
 68. Id. at 870-71. 
 69. Id. at 870. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 870-71. 
 72. Id. at 870 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 
(1985)). 
 73. Id. at 870-71 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 871. 
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rationale and asserted that it was not connected to a “navigable water” by a 
“relatively permanent water.”80  
In February 2012, Hawkes received an approved JD from the Corps 
asserting they had jurisdiction under a new rationale (stating a “significant 
nexus” existed between the property and the Red River of the North).81 In 
April 2012, the plaintiffs subsequently appealed the approved JD under CWA 
regulations.82 In October of 2012, the Corps Review Officer rejected the 
plaintiff’s arguments but ultimately remanded the JD for further 
determination regarding the “[p]roperty’s chemical, physical, and biological 
effects on the Red River of the North.”83 Finally, in December 2012, the Corps 
issued a revised JD, a “final Corps approved jurisdictional decision,” again 
stating that the Corps had jurisdiction over the property under the CWA.84 
The final revised, approved JD was not appealable.85  
Thus, in January 2013, over three years after starting the process, Hawkes 
brought his dispute to U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota to 
challenge the JD of the Corps.86 The district court in Hawkes dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claim, holding that it failed to pass the Bennett test.87 Since Hawkes 
was considered a case of first impression within the Eighth Circuit, the 
district court relied heavily on an analogous case in the Ninth Circuit, 
Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Army Corps of Engineers.88 Following the 
court’s rationale in Fairbanks, the district court found that the JD indeed 
represented the “consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking process.”89 
“The court in Fairbanks reasoned that when the Corps issues a jurisdictional 
determination, and upholds it on administrative appeal, the Corps itself 
treats the determination as ‘final.’”90 However, the district court found the 
second condition of the Bennett test unsatisfied.91 The court, citing to both 
Fairbanks and the district court opinion in Belle, asserted the “[JD] does not 
                                                                                                                                        
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 873. 
 88. Id. at 872 (citing to Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 543 F.3d 
586 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 872-73 (citing Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 543 F.3d at 592). 
 91. Id. at 874. 
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fix [the plaintiff’s] rights or obligations. The Revised JD does not order 
Plaintiffs to take any kind of action. Although Plaintiffs may want to obtain 
a permit if they wish to expand their mining operations, the Corps has in no 
way obligated them to do so.”92  
The district court also distinguished between the JDs in the present case 
and the ACOs at issue in Sackett.93 While the JD lacked any penalty or 
obligation for Hawkes, the Sackett plaintiffs were under the risk of severe 
penalty for non-compliance if they refused to act.94 The court further noted 
that the JD did not inhibit the plaintiffs from seeking to obtain a permit from 
the Corps.95 This, the court concluded, further distinguished the case from 
Sackett, since the plaintiff could file suit through the administrative process 
by applying for a permit.96 The failure to satisfy both Bennett conditions, and 
the availability of other “remedies,” rendered the JD “not reviewable” in the 
eyes of the district court.97 This set the stage for the plaintiff’s appeal to the 
Eighth Circuit.  
B.  Hawkes in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a narrow question on 
appeal: whether the finality standard in Sackett should also apply to JDs when 
the party has neither completed the permit process nor exposed itself to the 
risk of substantial penalties by avoiding the process.98 At the outset of the 
opinion, the court reiterated the issues and holdings found by the district 
court and recognized that authority cited in support of the lower court’s 
ruling (Belle) had since been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.99 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that both the lower court and the court in 
Belle misapplied Sackett and set out to justify its reversal of the lower court.100 
The court began by putting forth the relevant statutory law (the CWA) 
and then set the tone for the opinion by quoting Rapanos v. United States.101 
                                                                                                                                        
 92. Id. at 875. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 877. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 878. 
 98. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013), rev’d 
and remanded, 782 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corp of 
Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015). 
 99. Id. at 996-97. See also Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 
2014). 
 100. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 996. 
 101. Id. at 996. 
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The court stated that the broad definition of “navigable waters” has 
empowered the Corps and EPA “to make ‘sweeping assertions of jurisdiction’ 
over every stream, ditch, and drain that can be considered a tributary of, and 
every wetland that is adjacent to, traditional navigable waters.”102 With that, 
the court recognized that although the Corps may require a permit to 
discharge materials into wetlands that are located adjacent to “waters of the 
United States,” it rejected the position that the Corps possessed jurisdiction 
under the CWA over “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters.”103 Indeed, 
although the appellate court accepted the facts as stated by the district court 
with little modification, it noted that the wetland in question was located 120 
miles away from the allegedly “adjacent” navigable waters.104  
The court concluded its introduction by stating that two tests, both from 
Rapanos, were at play.105 The two tests in Rapanos came from the plurality 
opinion written by Justice Scalia, the “relatively permanent” test,106 and the 
concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, the “significant nexus” test.107 The 
court stated that since the Supreme Court “adopted different narrower tests 
to determine when wetlands are ‘waters of the United States,’ we held ‘that 
the Corps has jurisdiction over wetlands that satisfy either . . . test’ . . . .”108 
The heart of the plaintiff’s contention was that the Corps failed both of these 
tests.109 Yet the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim was predicated 
on the fact that the district court did not consider the revised, approved JD a 
“final agency action” under both conditions of the Bennett test and thus not 
                                                                                                                                        
 102. Id. (quoting Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 726–727 (2006) (plurality opinion)). 
 103. Id. at 997.  
 104. Id. at 997-98. 
 105. Id. at 999. 
 106. The “relatively permanent” test states that “‘the waters of the United States’ include 
only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water,” such as “streams,” “oceans,” 
“rivers,” “lakes,” and “bodies” of water “forming geographical features.” Rapanos v. U.S., 547 
U.S. 715, 732-33 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 107. The “significant nexus” test states that wetlands “constitute ‘navigable waters’ under 
the Act, a water or wetland must possess a “significant nexus” to waters that are or were 
navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.” Justice Kennedy further clarified 
stating, “wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase 
‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the 
region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered 
waters . . . understood as “navigable.” Id. at 759, 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 108. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 997 (citing United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 
2009)). 
 109. Id. at 999. 
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suitable for judicial review.110 It was on this point that the court of appeals 
focused its analysis.  
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the first condition, 
that the JD was the “consummation of the Corps’ decisionmaking,” was met 
in the Corps’ revised approved JD.111 The court then scrutinized the district 
court’s holding that the JD did not satisfy the second Bennett condition. The 
court set forth a litany of cases that demonstrated the district court 
exaggerated the difference between an “agency order that compels 
affirmative action, and an order that prohibits a party from taking otherwise 
lawful action.” 112  
En route to finding the second Bennett condition satisfied, the court made 
several key observations in its flyover of relevant case law. First, the court 
noted that the revised approved JD forced the plaintiff to choose between 
either paying a substantial cost for the permit process, or to relent to the 
frustration and not use the land, or risk various penalties for non-compliant 
use.113 Next, the court recognized that the specificity of the order provided an 
“even stronger coercive effect” than a similar case involving an ambiguous 
agency regulation which required a permit (and which was ultimately 
deemed to satisfy the second Bennett condition).114 Lastly, the court found 
the order “adversely affect[ed] [the] appellant’s right to use their property in 
conducting lawful business activity.”115 Even though the court found the 
order was not “self-executing,” it cited to Sackett to reiterate that “the APA 
provides for judicial review of all final agency actions, not just those that 
impose a self-executing sanction.”116 
The majority concluded its opinion by analyzing whether obtaining a 
permit or proceeding sans permit and challenging an eventual compliance 
order, were adequate remedies under the APA.117 The court recognized that 
the district court, and the defendant, failed to recognize the “prohibitive cost” 
in either “alternative.”118 The court stated the permit process was 
                                                                                                                                        
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1000. The court noted that a “biological opinion,” “prescription drug labelling 
regulations,” an agency order declaring “certain agricultural commodities were not exempt 
from regulations,” and an agency regulation barring the “licensing of stations that enter into 
network contract,” all satisfied the second Bennett condition. Id. at 1000-01. 
 113. Id. at 1001-02. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1001. 
 116. Id. (citing Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1373 (2012)).   
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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“prohibitively expensive”119 and the plaintiff’s amended complaint revealed 
that the Corps had informed Hawkes that the permit “would ultimately be 
refused.”120 This information alone, the court stated, would be sufficient to 
satisfy the second Bennett condition.121 Furthermore, commencing the 
mining operation and waiting for an ACO would be, in the court’s words, 
“plainly an inadequate remedy.”122 Besides reeking of bad faith, since the 
plaintiff’s already knew of the permit process, it would expose the plaintiff to 
substantial risk of administrative, civil, and criminal penalties.123 
The court, channeling Justice Scalia’s righteous indignation at regulatory 
overreach in Rapanos, concluded by leveling an indictment against the 
Corps. The court is best heard in its own words:  
The prohibitive costs, risk, and delay of these alternatives to 
immediate judicial review evidence a transparently obvious 
litigation strategy: by leaving appellants with no immediate 
judicial review and no adequate alternative remedy, the Corps will 
achieve the result its local officers desire, abandonment of the peat 
mining project, without having to test whether its expansive 
assertion of jurisdiction—rejected by one of their own 
commanding officers on administrative appeal—is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s limiting decision in Rapanos. For 
decades, the Corps has “deliberately left vague” the “definitions 
used to make jurisdictional determinations,” leaving its District 
offices free to treat as waters of the United States “adjacent 
wetlands” that “are connected to the navigable water by flooding, 
on average, once every 100 years,” or are simply “within 200 feet 
of a tributary.”124 
The court finished its critique by stating the Corps’ view of the revised, 
approved JD “ignores reality” and ended by quoting Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion in Sackett, stating that without judicial review “the 
impracticality of otherwise obtaining review, combined with ’the uncertain 
reach of the [CWA] and the draconian penalties imposed for the sort of 
violations alleged in this case . . . leaves most property owners with little 
                                                                                                                                        
 119. The court stated: “the average applicant for an individual Corps permit ‘spends 788 
days and $271,596 in completing the process.’” Id. (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 
715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 727–28). 
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practical alternative but to dance to the [agency’s] tune.’”125 With that, the 
court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to district court.126 
Judge Kelly concurred, but raised several legitimate concerns with the 
majority’s reasoning. First, Judge Kelly questioned how much weight the 
majority should have put on the inherent difficulty in the permit process as 
it relates to determining whether the JD constituted a final agency action.127 
Next, Judge Kelly noted the difference between an ACO and a JD, stating that 
the former accrues a penalty and the latter possesses no attached penalty at 
all.128 However, Judge Kelly ultimately agreed with the majority since there 
were no “acceptable options to challenge the JD, absent judicial review.”129 In 
concluding there was no other adequate remedy, Judge Kelly pointed to 
Sackett and recognized a critical fact: the CWA is not just any other law.130 
“[M]ost laws do not require the hiring of expert consultants to determine if 
they even apply to you or your property. This jurisdictional determination 
was precisely what the Court deemed reviewable in Sackett.”131 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE HOLDING IN HAWKES 
The Supreme Court should affirm Hawkes and recognize that a JD 
determines both rights and obligations, and is the consummation of the 
Corps’ decisionmaking process. For a JD to be subject to judicial review 
under the APA, it must be: (1) a final agency action; and (2) there must be no 
other adequate remedy avaliable in court (often termed “no other reasonable 
alternative” to judicial review).132 As discussed above, to be considered a final 
agency action, the two finality conditions put forth in Bennett must be 
satisfied.133 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have both recognized that a JD 
satisfies the first Bennett condition (i.e. the JD is the consummation of the 
Corps’ decisionmaking process.)134 Thus, the court in Hawkes focused 
primarily on the second Bennett condition, and on whether there existed any 
other adequate remedy in a court.135 Below, two critical points will illustrate 
                                                                                                                                        
 125. Id. at 1002-03 (citing Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 126. Id. at 1002. 
 127. Id. at 1003. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 704. 
 133. See supra Section II.C. 
 134. See Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 135. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1000-01. 
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that a JD satisfies the second condition of the Bennett test, and accordingly 
the holding in Hawkes should be affirmed for two reasons. First, because the 
JD determines the “rights” of the landowner, and second, because the JD 
determines the “obligations” of the landowner.  
It should be noted at the outset, however, that the court in Hawkes rested 
its holding that the second Bennett condition was satisfied on the weak 
foundation of the JD’s regulatory impact.136 This emphasis is misplaced. By 
focusing on the peripheral impact of the regulatory action, instead of the JD 
itself, the court missed an opportunity to analyze the JD for rights and 
obligations inherent within it. Comments pertaining to scope and impact are 
more relevant in determining whether any other adequate remedy exists to 
judicial review, as required by the APA. Yet, looking at the JD itself allows 
the courts to properly analyze finality and reviewability under the statutory 
framework of the APA and the CWA respectively. 
A.  The JD Determines the Rights of the Landowner: It is More Than a 
Classification 
As previously stated, the second Bennett condition requires that the 
agency action determine “rights or obligations,” or that “legal consequences 
will flow” from its issuance, in order for an agency action to be considered 
final, and thus reviewable under the APA.137 When a JD declares a landowner 
is subject to the permit process, courts curiously tend to scrutinize JDs in 
terms of their obligation-determining capacity without regard to their 
potential rights-determining capacity. In reading both Belle and Hawkes it 
appears that each court makes a similar assumption in its reasoning: that a 
JD declaring the landowner subject to the permit process would appear to 
establish solely an obligation to complete it (which both courts focus on in 
their analysis).138 This is an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the 
second Bennett condition, one which should not hold future courts captive 
                                                                                                                                        
 136. Id. (“[The District Court’s] analysis seriously understates the impact of the regulatory 
action at issue by exaggerating the distinction between an agency order that compels 
affirmative action, and an order that prohibits a party from taking otherwise lawful action. 
Numerous Supreme Court precedents confirm that this is not a basis on which to determine 
whether ‘rights or obligations have been determined’ or that ‘legal consequences will flow’ 
from agency action . . . . Likewise, here, the Revised JD requires appellants either to incur 
substantial compliance costs (the permitting process), forego what they assert is lawful use of 
their property, or risk substantial enforcement penalties.”). 
 137. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). 
 138. Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013), 
rev’d and remanded, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corp of 
Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015).  
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to neglecting consideration of the right-determining nature of the JDs. 
Courts should instead fully apply the Bennett test and consider both the 
obligation-determining and the right-determining aspects of the JD to see if 
either is present, thus satisfying the second condition under Bennett. 
The court in Belle failed to truly grapple with the possibility of a JD 
declaring a land to not be considered waters of the United States. In this 
situation, a landowner would not be subject to the permit process. The court 
in Hawkes touched briefly on this possibility and referenced a Regulatory 
Guidance Letter (Letter) from the Corps stating: 
The Corps’ Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08–02, at 2, 5, 
described an Approved JD as a “definitive, official 
determination that there are, or that there are not, jurisdictional 
‘waters of the United States’ on a site,” and stated that an 
Approved JD “can be relied upon by a landowner, permit 
applicant, or other affected party . . . for five years” (quotation 
omitted).139 
Although the main purpose of the Letter was to help landowners understand 
the differences between approved JDs, like the ones in both Belle and Hawkes, 
and preliminary JDs, which are issued earlier in the regulatory process, the 
Letter is powerful evidence of the right-determining nature an approved 
JD.140 
The Letter goes on to state that an approved JD “can be used and relied on 
by the recipient . . . if a CWA citizen’s lawsuit is brought in the Federal Courts 
against the landowner or other ‘affected party,’ challenging the legitimacy of 
that JD or its determinations.”141 Here, the Corps is clarifying that the 
                                                                                                                                        
 139. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 999. 
 140. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08-02, June 26, 2008 
at 1 (“This Regulatory Guidance Letter (RGL) explains the differences between these two types 
of JDs [preliminary and approved] and provides guidance on when an approved JD is required 
and when a landowner, permit applicant, or other “affected party” can decline to request and 
obtain an approved JD and elect to use a preliminary JD instead.” (footnote omitted)). It 
should also be noted that courts have often recognized that administrative agencies, the Corps 
being one, are bound not only by the precepts of their governing statutes, but also by those of 
their regulations. See Doraiswamy v. Sec’y of Labor, 555 F.2d 832, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(“Without a doubt, ‘an administrative agency is bound not only by the precepts of its 
governing statute but also by those incorporated into its own regulations . . . .’”). Although it 
is questionable whether the Regulatory Guidance Letter is itself a regulation, at the very least 
it illuminates the regulatory precept by which the Corps is bound. See also Abbott-Nw. Hosp., 
Inc. v. Schweiker, 698 F.2d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 141. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory Guidance Letter No. 08-02, June 26, 2008 
at 2. 
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approved JD can be used in defending the landowner from lawsuits regarding 
how the land is being used pursuant to or in violation of the CWA. If the 
approved JD did not determine the rights of the landowner, then how could 
it provide a defense for the landowner? The Corps states in the Letter that 
this determination is valid for five years, and that it can be “used and relied 
on” when its legitimacy has been challenged.142 Thus when a landowner is 
challenged in court, they can point to the JD and assert their rights as 
determined by the Corps. When the approved JDs in Belle and Hawkes 
requiring the landowners to complete the permit process are viewed together 
an approved JD that does not require the landowner to complete permit 
process, it becomes clear that a JD determines at least rights, if not also 
obligations, either of which is sufficient to satisfy the second Bennett 
condition.  
Moreover, the court in Belle failed to truly address whether rights were 
determined. Instead, it focused mainly on whether obligations were 
determined by the JD.143 The court merely noted: 
[A]uthorizing judicial review of JDs, to the extent that it would 
disincentivize the Corps from providing them, would undermine 
the system through which property owners can ascertain their rights 
and evaluate their options with regard to their 
properties before they are subject to compliance orders and 
enforcement actions for violations of the CWA.144 
Here the court curiously seems to explicitly recognize the role of JDs within 
the regulatory system: that their issuance determines the rights of the 
landowner prior to punishment under the CWA. Thus, since the JD 
“determines rights,” the second Bennett condition should have been 
considered satisfied, yet the court would go on to conclude just the 
opposite.145  
B.  The JD Determines the Obligations of the Landowner: It is a Part of the 
Permit Process Subject to a Penalty under 33 USC § 1319 
A JD issued by the Corps carries with it the obligation of completing the 
permitting process, and is a part of the larger penalty scheme under the APA. 
                                                                                                                                        
 142. Id. (stating that approved JD “can be relied upon by a landowner, permit applicant, 
or other ‘affected party’ (as defined at 33 C.F.R. § 331.2) who receives an approved JD for five 
years.”). 
 143. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390-94 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 144. Id. at 394 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added). 
 145. Id. 
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As stated above, the second Bennett condition requires that the agency action 
must determine “rights or obligations,” or that “legal consequences will flow” 
from its issuance, to be considered final.146 The courts in Hawkes and Belle 
focused heavily on the second Bennett condition, specifically on whether 
obligations were determined, in evaluating whether the JD was reviewable. 
The Fifth Circuit relied on a mountain of precedent, both pre- and post-
Sackett, in attempting to distinguish between a JD and an ACO and held that 
the JD was merely a “classification” and that regardless of the prohibitive cost 
of compliance with the permit process it was insufficient to consider the JD 
a final agency action.147 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, holding that the sheer 
cost of compliance and the lack of ready alternatives to judicial review were 
sufficient to find that the second Bennett condition was satisfied.148  
The court in Belle drew a distinction between the JD at issue and the ACO 
in Sackett on grounds that a JD is merely a “classification [of the land in 
question] as wetlands . . . not [obligating] Belle to do or refrain from doing 
anything to its property.”149 Yet, in the next sentence, the court stated that the 
JD “notifies Belle that a 404 permit will be required prior to filling, and [that 
the court was] cognizant that the Corps’s permitting process can be costly for 
regulated parties.”150 These two statements are befuddling. How is it that no 
obligation is determined by the JD, yet the JD notifies the landowner that 
they are obligated to complete the permit process? 
It appears that something even more elementary could be used to 
determine whether obligations are determined by the JD. That is, whether 
the JD contains any punitive power. If it can be said that a JD carries with it 
a punitive dimension, it must be said to determine obligations (either to act 
or refrain from acting). In Belle, the court found that a JD contains “no 
penalty scheme.”151 It went on to say that “[i]t imposes no penalties . . . . And 
neither the JD nor Corps regulations nor the CWA require [the landowner] 
to comply with the JD.”152 Judge Kelly’s concurring opinion in Hawkes 
echoed this position by asserting “[a] JD, however, has no such penalty 
scheme.”153 Yet in light of the landowner’s reality, these statements seem 
more like half-truths. First, while the JD itself does not contain an explicit 
                                                                                                                                        
 146. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). 
 147. Belle Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 761 F.3d 383, 390-92 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 148. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 1001 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. 
granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015). 
 149. Belle Co., 761 F.3d at 391. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Belle, 761 F.3d at 392. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1003.  
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penalty scheme—unlike the ACO—it does contain punitive dimensions. 
Second, although the JD does not in and of itself “require” compliance, it puts 
the landowner on notice that compliance is required.  
The CWA, from which JDs derive their statutory authority, contains a 
specific provision that speaks to the Act’s enforcement and implementation. 
Under 33 U.S.C. § 1319, the Corps is given the power to issue orders,154 notify 
the State and give public notice of infractions, 155 and bring a civil action 
against the landowner,156 among several other punitive measures in the event 
of non-compliance.157 Although the intricacies of § 1319 are beyond the scope 
of this Note, it is important to recognize the several civil, criminal, and 
administrative penalties that are included in § 1319. The court in Hawkes 
recognized that these penalties loom over the head of any landowner who 
would pursue a permit, receive an undesired result via the JD, and then 
ignore the agency action and do the activity anyways. They reasoned that 
“[b]ecause appellants were forthright in undertaking to obtain a permit, 
choosing now to ignore the Revised JD and commence peat mining without 
the permit it requires would expose them to substantial criminal monetary 
penalties and even imprisonment for a knowing CWA violation.”158 This fact 
by itself clearly demonstrates that obligations are determined, and that legal 
consequences most certainly flow from the issuance of the JD.  
This, however, does not answer Belle’s contention that the JD does not 
have a penalty scheme. Indeed, the JD itself does not. However, the critical 
distinction is that the JD, although by itself powerless, is a part of the larger 
CWA § 1319 penalty scheme, as it is part of the permit process. One need 
only look at the “knowing violations” under criminal penalties in § 
1319(6)(c)(2) to recognize that a landowner who has read a JD, and willingly 
defied it, would easily satisfy the mens rea required by the statutory 
prohibitions against unpermitted discharging.159 Thus, in the likely event of 
                                                                                                                                        
 154. 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(a)(1) (West 2016). 
 155. 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(a)(2). 
 156. 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(a)(3). 
 157. See generally 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(a)(6). 
 158. Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013), rev’d 
and remanded, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corp of 
Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015) (emphasis added). 
 159. In her concurring opinion, Judge Kelly stated that she agreed with other courts that 
the penalty for a JD is much more speculative than that found in Sackett, and asserted that the 
JD itself has no penalty scheme. Id. at 1003. Furthermore, Judge Kelly stated that Hawkes could 
provide a single case where increased penalties were issued against a landowner for violating 
a JD. Id. However, Judge Kelly’s position is more of an argument from silence than a death 
blow to the idea that there is no punitive dimension to a JD. Her position fails to acknowledge 
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conviction, the landowner would be subject to heavy fines and lengthy prison 
sentences.160 
Furthermore, to find as the court in Belle did that a JD does not “require” 
compliance, is much like saying a statute subjecting all cars on public 
roadways to registration does not “require” compliance from an aspiring 
driver. Indeed, the driver does have several theoretical options: he could not 
buy a car and use public transportation; he could buy a car but not drive it; 
he could buy a car but only drive it on his own land; or he could buy a car, 
not register it, and break the law until he is caught. Yet these options are 
absurd. They do not comport with the aspirations of the driver, the reality of 
car ownership, or the intent of the legislature. The statute clearly obliges the 
driver to register his or her car. Likewise, it is possible to say a JD does not 
                                                                                                                                        
the role of the JD in the larger CWA penalty scheme, and wrongfully assumes that the JD itself 
must include a penalty within its statutory language to have any punitive or obligatory 
characteristics. 
 160. Two specific enforcement provisions, listed below in pertinent part, are particularly 
relevant for a landowner who knowingly fails to comply with a JD and does not complete the 
permit process: 
(2) Knowing violations 
Any person who-- 
(A) knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, 
or 1345 of this title, . . .or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this title by 
the Secretary of the Army or by a State; 
. . .  
shall be punished by a fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per 
day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or by both. If 
a conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a first conviction 
of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not 
more than $100,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more 
than 6 years, or by both. 
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(2) (West 2016). 
(3) Knowing endangerment 
(A) General rule  
Any person who knowingly violates section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, 1317, 
1318, 1321(b)(3), 1328, . . . or in a permit issued under section 1344 of this 
title by the Secretary of the Army or by a State, and who knows at that time 
that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious 
bodily injury, shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than 
$250,000 or imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both. A person 
which is an organization shall, upon conviction of violating this 
subparagraph, be subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000. If a conviction 
of a person is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such person 
under this paragraph, the maximum punishment shall be doubled with 
respect to both fine and imprisonment. 
33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c). 
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“require” compliance, but to do so would be disingenuous and does not 
comport with the reality of landownership, the aspirations of the landowner, 
or the true intent of the Corps. The JD clearly obliges the landowner to 
complete the permit process. 
These two points, that the JD determines rights and is more than a 
“classification,” and that the JD is a part of the permit process subject to the 
larger statutory penalty scheme, are important in illustrating the finality of 
the JD under the Bennett conditions. Although the court in Hawkes 
ultimately rested its holding on the foundation that “no other adequate 
judicial remedy”161 existed to judicial review, it is important for the Supreme 
Court to recognize that there are aspects intrinsic to the JD itself, removed 
from the specific facts of Hawkes, which make it a final agency action 
reviewable under the APA. Finality under the Bennett conditions, however, 
is just one part of the court’s analysis in determining the reviewability of a 
JD. The other part of the court’s analysis centered on if any other adequate 
remedy existed, as required by the APA. This will be discussed in greater 
detail below, in the context of the court’s great analytical flaw. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ABANDON ANY PRUDENTIAL CRITIQUE IN 
DETERMINING IF ANY OTHER ADEQUATE REMEDY EXISTS 
Although the Eighth Circuit was ultimately correct in its holding that a 
revised, approved JD is a final agency action subject to judicial review under 
the APA, it went too far in analyzing the last requirement under the APA. In 
answering the question of whether there is any other adequate remedy in a 
court, the court transgressed its role as the judiciary in its analysis. In that 
analysis, the Hawkes court went beyond the parties involved to the larger 
regulatory framework within which the JD operates, concluding that the cost 
and efficiency of the permitting process rendered it an inadequate alternative 
to judicial review. Thus, the court improperly injected a prudential criticism 
of the executive branch’s regulatory scheme into what should have been a 
solely legal analysis of the executive’s actions. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
should look to procedural inefficiencies in appealing, not the regulatory 
inefficiencies and costs of permitting, in settling the issue of reviewability. 
The great irony of Hawkes is that in determining whether the JD is subject to 
judicial review, the court of appeals transgressed its own role as the judiciary, 
inappropriately using judicial review to tell the Executive Branch how to 
operate.  
                                                                                                                                        
 161. Hawkes¸ 782 F.3d at 1001. 
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Furthermore, Judge Kelly in her concurring opinion raised several valid 
points regarding the JD itself and the majority’s reasoning, which would have 
avoided the issues created by the court while still reaching the conclusion that 
no other adequate remedy existed. Failing to integrate Judge Kelly’s position, 
the majority unnecessarily blemishes an otherwise valid opinion with the hue 
of an invalid prudential critique. The Corps is simply acting within its 
legitimate delegation of power. Ultimately, any regulatory inefficiencies or 
burdensome costs should be legitimately remedied by the Executive or 
Legislative branches, and should not be considered dispositive in evaluating 
the final requirement for judicial review under the APA. The Supreme Court 
must recognize that any comment beyond the controversy before them is 
superfluous to its judicial role. Below, both the doctrine of judicial review and 
the role of the judiciary will be briefly elucidated to provide the basis for 
understanding the Eighth Circuit’s inappropriate prudential critique of the 
Corps. Ultimately, it is this reasoning by the Eighth Circuit that should be 
abandoned by the Supreme Court, while holding that no other adequate 
remedy exists aside from judicial review. 
A.  Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review 
No case has influenced the doctrine of judicial review more than Marbury 
v. Madison.162 In Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall set the standard for 
the Court’s role as interpreter of the Constitution and as a check among the 
various branches of government. Obviously a full treatment of judicial review 
is beyond the scope of this Note. Indeed, many great treatments have already 
been undertaken.163 Yet, it is important to broach the subject here because it 
runs to the heart of what the plaintiffs in Hawkes are seeking, and it is what 
the Eighth Circuit inappropriately used in analyzing the reviewability of the 
JD. Much like Hawkes, Marbury deals with the interplay of several facets of 
governmental mechanics.  
Dean Jeffrey Tuomala summarizes the background of Marbury as follows: 
In the waning days of his administration, President John Adams 
appointed William Marbury to serve as a Justice of the Peace for 
the County of Washington of the District of Columbia, an office 
created under the Judiciary Act of 1789. Adams signed Marbury’s 
commission, and Secretary of State John Marshall affixed the seal 
of the United States to it but failed to deliver it to Marbury before 
                                                                                                                                        
 162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 163. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundation of Law, 4 
LIBERTY U. L. REV. 297 (2010). 
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Adams’ successor, Thomas Jefferson, took office. Jefferson’s 
Secretary of State, James Madison, refused to deliver the 
commission, so Marbury filed a lawsuit against Madison in the 
Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Madison to 
deliver the commission. Madison failed to answer Marbury’s 
complaint, failed to respond to an order to show cause issued from 
the Court explaining why judgment should not issue against him, 
and failed to appear at trial, either personally or through counsel. 
The Court proceeded to trial in Madison’s absence.164 
The Court in Marbury directly and indirectly addressed the issues of 
jurisdiction, separation of powers, and most notably judicial review proper, 
en route to deciding the fate of Marbury’s commission. For the purposes of 
this Note, it is sufficient to recognize some of the main principles of Marbury 
and apply them to the court’s reasoning in Hawkes. This is in an effort to 
demonstrate how the Eighth Circuit’s rationale could have been stronger by 
omitting its prudential critique of the Corps’ administrative process, while 
properly finding that no other adequate remedy existed aside from judicial 
review. 
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the President is accountable 
only to the political will of the nation in the exercise of his political powers 
and therefore “political” subjects are outside the scope of judicial review.165 It 
is the President’s authoritative discretion executed through his or her own 
political will, or that which has been delegated to his or her officers, which is 
immune from judicial review.166 In describing the nature of the three 
branches of government, Dean Tuomala rightly points out that by definition 
Executive and Legislative powers are “political or prudential” and are 
uniform in their “imposition of will.”167 This puts the discretionary, yet 
                                                                                                                                        
 164. Id. at 301-02. 
 165. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-66 (1803) (“By the constitution of the United 
States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of 
which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political 
character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is 
authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his 
orders. In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the 
manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power 
to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual 
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.”). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Tuomala, supra note 163, at 329-30 (“The executive and legislative powers . . . are 
political or prudential in nature. In addition to being forward-looking in nature, the political 
powers have in common the fact that they emphasize the imposition of will, though always 
circumscribed by law. . . . Congress, in exercising the legislative power, makes judgments as to 
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constitutional, acts of the Executive and Legislative branches beyond the 
reach of judicial review, and subject only to the political consequences of such 
an action.  
At issue in Hawkes is a blend of Executive and Legislative decisions. The 
CWA (Legislative) endows the Corps (Executive) with the ability to 
promulgate regulations in the administration of the CWA permit process.168 
Challenging the reviewability of the JD invokes Chief Justice Marshall’s 
caution in Marbury that political subjects “respect the nation, not individual 
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is 
conclusive.”169 It is not the role of the Judiciary to excuse absolute compliance 
with Executive agencies or Legislative enactments because they are too 
inefficient or cumbersome. It has rightly been recognized that “[j]udges may 
pass on the propriety of legislative acts or executive implementation only in 
a properly constituted judicial case. This requirement provides an internal 
check on judicial power.”170 Hawkes was no such case for the Eighth Circuit 
to critique the Corps’ regulatory process.171  
B.  The Judiciary’s Role and its Purpose 
A brief survey of the roles of the three branches of government yields a 
clear paradigm through which to understand how the court in Hawkes 
transgressed its judicial role as it pertains to its critique of the Corps’ 
regulatory process. The Legislative Branch serves in a forward-looking 
capacity, and operates to make rules with uniform application to further a 
                                                                                                                                        
the best means of achieving constitutional objectives or ends. The President makes his best 
judgment in allocating resources and applying force to achieve those ends. The necessity and 
expediency of those political judgments are not subject to judicial review. The judicial power 
does not entail the exercise of will (courts do not make law; the law already exists), and it does 
not entail the use of force (courts do not execute their own judgments; they depend upon the 
executive branch). Courts exercise only judgment—not political judgment that is forward-
looking, but judicial judgment that is backward-looking in nature.” (emphasis added)). 
 168. See generally, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2015). 
 169. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166. 
 170. Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. 
L. REV. 1253, 1271 (1988). 
 171. A more appropriate case would be after the JD is conclusively recognized as 
reviewable, and the merits of the plaintiff’s case are reached by the court. Hawkes, however, 
does not truly get to the merits of the case (whether the wetland owned by the plaintiff should 
be considered waters of the United States). Here, it is reviewability of the JD (essentially 
whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction) that is the question – not whether the 
regulatory determination of the Corps is itself legitimate. 
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lawful object or purpose.172 The Executive Branch looks forward, imposing 
its lawful will on the people in executing the rules put forth by the 
legislature.173 Finally, the Judicial Branch operates solely looking backwards, 
adjudicating only the case or controversy before it, and giving no thought to 
future implications or purposes.174 Furthermore, it is important to reiterate 
Chief Justice Marshall’s timeless phrase that “[i]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”175 while also 
recognizing that: 
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of 
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive 
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. 
Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be 
made in this court.176 
With this understanding of the three branches of government in mind, it 
becomes clear that great restraint is required to properly adjudicate such 
politically charged disputes as the one in Hawkes. Moreover, the court in 
Hawkes appears to be looking forward, not backwards, in its discussion of 
“reality” and pragmatism.177 Regardless of how difficult it may be, the 
judiciary must avoid making political judgments on discretionary decision-
making or disagreeable enactments by the Executive or Legislative Branches 
respectively.  
C.  The Invalid Prudential Critique in Hawkes 
The principal issue in Hawkes is about the reviewability of a Corps 
determination, not the content of the JD, not the permit process, and not the 
                                                                                                                                        
 172. Tuomala, supra note 163, at 329 (“The action of legislating . . . is forward-looking or 
prospective in nature. . . . The focus is on formulating rules best designed to achieve some 
lawful object of government. The process of legislation may entail codifying preexisting law, 
be it inalienable rights or general principles of law, but its distinguishing characteristic is that 
it designs positive enactments to best achieve legitimate government objectives. The second 
characteristic that distinguishes the legislative from the judicial process is that legislation is 
framed in general terms regulating all persons similarly situated.”). 
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. 
 175. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 176. Id. at 170. 
 177. Hawkes Co., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Minn. 2013), 
rev’d and remanded, 782 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., U.S. Army Corp of 
Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 615 (2015).  
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Corps itself.178 It is apparent that the Eighth Circuit’s prudential reasoning 
inappropriately instructs the court’s rationale, taints its holding, and 
transgresses the court’s judicial role as defined in Marbury. It was clear from 
the Corps’ discussion with the plaintiffs that, for all intents and purposes, the 
permit process was a sham and was going to be ultimately unsuccessful.179 
Armed with this information, in addition to the fact that rights were 
determined, obligations created, and no other alternative existed aside from 
breaking the law, it was clear that the JD should be considered a final agency 
action. Moreover, it is important to reiterate the Corps’ admission that 
pursuit of a permit would ultimately be unsuccessful.180 Yet, the court delved 
further into an analysis of the cost, the burden, and the efficiency of the 
permit process and declared it a hurdle too high for the plaintiff to clear.181  
Furthermore, in trying to prove the point that government regulation has 
grown too unwieldy in the light of ambiguous precedent, the court lost 
credibility by declaring the permit process as a whole, not just as applied to 
the plaintiffs, an inadequate alternative remedy to judicial review.182 This 
pronouncement of virtual invalidity due to regulatory impracticability 
sounds of judicial will, not simply judicial review. As such, the court 
establishes a precedent that goes too far. The great irony of Hawkes is that in 
accusing the Corps’ schematic regulatory overreach, it overreaches itself to 
tell the Executive Branch how to do its job. 
Transgressing Chief Justice Marshall’s exhortation in Marbury, the court 
in Hawkes goes beyond the parties at bar and pronounces a much wider 
indictment on the Corps: 
The prohibitive costs, risk, and delay of [the permit process and 
its alternatives] to immediate judicial review evidence a 
transparently obvious litigation strategy: by leaving appellants 
with no immediate judicial review and no adequate alternative 
remedy, the Corps will achieve the result its local officers desire, 
abandonment of the peat mining project, without having to test 
                                                                                                                                        
 178. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 997. 
 179. Id. at 1001. 
 180. Id. (“Moreover, the Amended Complaint alleged that the Corps’ District 
representatives repeatedly made it clear to Kevin Pierce, to a Hawkes employee, and to the 
landowner that a permit to mine peat would ultimately be refused. In our view, this alone 
demonstrates that the second Bennett factor is satisfied.” (emphasis original)).  
 181. Id. (“First, as a practical matter, the permitting option is prohibitively expensive and 
futile. The Supreme Court reported in Rapanos, that the average applicant for an individual 
Corps permit ‘spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing the process.’” (citations omitted)). 
 182. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1001. 
566 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:537 
 
whether its expansive assertion of jurisdiction . . . . For decades, 
the Corps has “deliberately left vague” the “definitions used to 
make jurisdictional determinations,” leaving its District offices 
free to treat as waters of the United States “adjacent wetlands” that 
“are connected to the navigable water by flooding, on average, 
once every 100 years,” or are simply “within 200 feet of a 
tributary.”183 
In transgressing the boundaries of judicial review, the court in Hawkes quotes 
extensively from Rapanos and Sackett in its holding that an approved JD is 
subject to Judicial Review under the APA. The court in Rapanos and Sackett 
spoke emphatically against governmental agencies that encroached upon the 
rights of citizens in the name of regulatory compliance.184 The court in 
Hawkes channeled this sentiment with extensive quotations from both 
Rapanos and Sackett and, in this regard, does so to its detriment. One 
commentator has noted that “Sackett [was a] step by the Supreme Court in 
the direction of hindering the EPA’s enforcement capabilities . . . . [T]he EPA 
is doing a job that Congress empowered it to do.”185 
In concluding that a revised approved JD was reviewable under the APA, 
the court in Hawkes stated that it was compelled to do so by “reality” and “a 
properly pragmatic analysis.”186 According to the court, the regulatory 
process is impracticable, unnavigable without undue cost or burden to the 
plaintiff.187 But cost and efficiency should not change the reviewability of an 
action. In this regard, Judge Kelly’s concurring opinion recognizes the court’s 
glaring flaw. 
Concurring in judgment, Judge Kelly remarked that the JD’s reviewability 
is a “close question,” but one which should ultimately be answered in favor 
                                                                                                                                        
 183. Id. at 1001-02.  
 184. See, e.g., Sackett v. E.P.A., 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); Rapanos 
v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726–727 (2006). 
 185. Jessica Pierce Quiggle, Note, Sackett v. EPA Uses Statutory Interpretation to Limit the 
EPA’s Power over Wetlands, Overruling A Majority and Leaving Circuits Split over Due Process, 
14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 325, 328 (2013).  
 186. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1002. The court in Hawkes cites to Bennett to say that “[I]n reality 
[the JD] has a powerful coercive effect.” Id. (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997)). 
This quote, however, is misplaced. It is one thing to say that the JD “in reality” contains 
punitive dimensions, and thus satisfies the second Bennett condition (since it determines an 
obligation). See supra Section  IV.B. It is quite another to say that the solely because the JD “in 
reality” coerces the landowner towards an impracticable regulatory scheme, that reviewability 
is now appropriate under the APA (since there is no other adequate remedy). Hawkes, 782 
F.3d at 1002. This wrongly puts the emphasis on the agency instead of the action. 
 187. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1002.  
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of the plaintiff.188 Judge Kelly rightly questioned the value of critiquing the 
permit process itself as a factor in determining reviewability. She skeptically 
questioned “how much weight should be given to the futility of the permit 
application for an individual applicant, or the time and cost spent applying, 
in determining whether or not the JD constitutes a final agency action.”189 
She further noted that “were the Corps to take steps to make the permit 
process both more efficient and less costly, the reviewability of the JD would 
not change.”190 Although some comment pertaining to the regulatory impact 
or scope of the JD may be helpful in determining whether there is any other 
adequate remedy to judicial review, making cost and efficiency of those 
alternatives the dispositive factors is inappropriate.  
Judge Kelly goes on to demonstrate that there is no reasonable alternative 
to judicial review, but does so without taking into consideration cost or 
efficiency of the regulatory process. Judge Kelly notes that Hawkes has only 
two options: (1) break the law, wait for an enforcement action, and raise a 
lack of jurisdiction under the CWA as a defense,191 or (2) to go through a 
“roundabout process” of applying and appealing: 
[The landowners would have to] apply for a permit (on the 
grounds that no permit is required) and, if the application is 
denied, appeal the denial in court. But what happens if Hawkes is, 
after all, granted a permit yet maintains it never needed one in the 
first place? It must decline the permit and challenge the original 
jurisdiction in court. This roundabout process does not seem to 
be an “adequate remedy” to the alternative of simply allowing 
Hawkes to bring the jurisdictional challenge in the first instance 
and to have an opportunity to show the CWA does not apply to 
its land at all.192 
This is the path that the majority should have taken in its analysis of the final 
requirement for judicial review under the APA. Judge Kelly notes that it is 
the procedural inefficiencies of challenging the JD, not the regulatory 
inefficiencies of acquiring a permit, which demonstrate an inadequate 
remedy and satisfy the second requirement under the APA. 
It is important, here, to return to Chief Justice Marshall’s main restraint 
on judicial review: “[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
                                                                                                                                        
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1003. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
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constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this 
court.”193 The court in Hawkes essentially answers a political question.194 The 
court rests its holding not on backward-looking judgment, but on a present 
and forward-looking prudential critique of pragmatism and “reality.”195 This 
transgresses the court’s proper judicial role. Considerations of cost and 
efficiency question the Executive’s discretion in how it has regulated and 
administered a congressionally enacted program. If the court takes issue with 
how the permit process operates, it should call on the President or Congress 
to remedy the situation through their respective constitutional avenues. 
Courts should not, however, make policy determinations from the bench. 
Thus, on appeal, the Supreme Court should look to procedural inefficiencies 
in appealing, not the regulatory inefficiencies and costs of permitting, in 
settling the issue of reviewability. As Judge Kelly rightly demonstrates, it is 
not required to critique the agency to recognize that its action is final and 
reviewable.196 
                                                                                                                                        
 193. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
 194. The political question that was answered was whether the Corps regulatory process 
was too burdensome, based on cost and efficiency, to complete the permit process before the 
landowner could appeal. It is helpful, here, to note the basic judicial definition of a political 
question. The court in Baker v. Carr provided such a definition and stated as follows: 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the 
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although 
each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the 
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a 
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment 
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or 
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements 
by various departments on one question. 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (emphasis added). The majority in Hawkes made an 
issue of both efficiency and cost, both of which were addressed by Judge Kelly in her 
concurring opinion. Hawkes, 782 F.3d at 1003. It is important to recognize that there is no 
judicially discoverable or manageable standard for determining when the permit process 
would be sufficiently painless or reasonably priced. Moreover, there is an explicit “lack of 
respect” for the discretion and judgment of Executive Branch, almost explicitly, in the court’s 
reasoning (particularly in its reliance on Rapanos and Sackett). 
 195. Id. at 1002. 
 196. Id. at 1003. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The court in Hawkes was correct in holding that an approved JD by the 
Corps was a final agency action, without any other adequate remedy in a 
court, and is thus reviewable under the APA. The court, however, should 
have focused on the JD itself, and not on the regulatory impact of the action, 
in determining whether it should be considered a final agency action under 
the Bennett conditions. The JD is more than a mere classification, as it 
determines the rights of the landowner. Moreover, the JD also determines the 
obligations of the landowner as it is a part of the permit process subject to a 
penalty under 33 U.S.C. § 1319. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit should have 
dispensed with its prudential critique of the regulatory scheme (referencing 
its cost and efficiency) in finding that no other adequate remedy existed, as 
such a critique falls outside the court’s constitutional power of judicial review 
and its proper judicial role. The majority would have done better to align 
itself with the concerns of Judge Kelly’s concurring opinion and omitted the 
discussion regarding regulatory efficiency in favor of a concise judicial 
interpretation of the law in light of the facts. Thus, the Supreme Court should 
affirm Hawkes not based on answering a political question of regulatory 
efficiency or affordability, but rather on the inadequacies of violating the law 
and the procedural inefficiencies of appealing. Then, perhaps, a landowner 
will finally be able to mine peat without fear of the government taking either 
his fortune or his freedom. 
  
